We investigate the structure of the degrees of provability, which measure the proof-theoretic strength of statements asserting the totality of given computable functions. The degrees of provability can also be seen as an extension of the investigation of relative consistency statements for firstorder arithmetic (which can be viewed as Π 0 1 -statements, whereas statements of totality of computable functions are Π 0 2 -statements); and the structure of the degrees of provability can be viewed as the Lindenbaum algebra of true Π 0 2 -statements in first-order arithmetic. Our work continues and greatly expands the second author's paper on this topic by answering a number of open questions from that paper, comparing three different notions of a jump operator and studying jump inversion as well as the corresponding high/low hierarchies, investigating the structure of true Π 0 1 -statements as a substructure, and connecting the degrees of provability to escape and domination properties of computable functions.
Introduction
The topic of this paper arises from two different directions in the study of logic. On the one hand, Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems tell us that given any sufficiently strong, consistent, effectively axiomatizable theory T for first-order arithmetic, there are even Π 0 1 -statements (stating the consistency of T ) that are not provable in T , but that are, of course, true. On the other hand, over the past seventy years, a number of researchers studying witness functions for various combinatorial statements have realized the importance of fast-growing functions and the fact that their totality is often not provable over a given sufficiently strong, consistent, effectively axiomatizable theory T for first-order arithmetic. Two famous examples are the Paris/Harrington Theorem [2] and the Kirby/Paris [4] work on Goodstein's Theorem. Since the totality of a given computable function can be formulated as a Π 0 2 -statement, the study of the proof-theoretic strength of statements about the totality of computable functions can be viewed as an extension of Gödel's study of statements about consistency.
This paper continues work of the second author [1] , investigating the degree structure of the provability degrees, or p-degrees. Let TA be true arithmetic, the first order theory of (N, +, ·, 0, 1). Fix any sufficiently strong, effectively axiomatizable theory T which is sound, i.e., its arithmetic consequences 1 are in TA (examples of such theories are ZFC and Peano arithmetic). A computable function ϕ is p-reducible to a total computable function ψ if, over T , the totality of ϕ can be proven from the totality of ψ. (Note, of course, that this really refers to algorithms for ϕ and ψ rather than just the functions ϕ and ψ!) Two computable functions are then p-equivalent if they are p-reducible to each other, and all computable functions that are p-equivalent to a given total computable function ϕ form the p-degree [ϕ] of ϕ. Clearly, the p-degrees can be thought of as true Π 0 2 -statements over T (i.e., we think of [ϕ] as "tot(ϕ)", the statement that "for each x, there is a stage s by which (the algorithm for) ϕ has converged on x").
Cai's work [1] has already shown that this structure is quite rich. He showed that the p-degrees form a distributive lattice with least element; indeed they form a sublattice of the Lindenbaum algebra of T with the natural interpretations of least element, join, and meet as the (p-degree of the) trivial formula, conjunction, and disjunction, respectively. In addition, it is natural to introduce three so-called "jump" operators to our structure. One corresponds, loosely speaking, to the assertion Con T (P ) of the consistency of T + P (for a Π 0 2 -statement P ), which we will call the "skip" of P (relative to T ). Formally, the skip of ϕ will be a computable function con(ϕ) that "codes" the consistency of T + tot(ϕ). The skip of ϕ need not always be p-above ϕ, so we also introduce the join of ϕ and its skip as the "hop" of ϕ, which we write as ϕ • . Finally, and most importantly, following Cai [1] , we define the "jump" of ϕ, which is a function ϕ * whose totality is equivalent to the statement that every function p-reducible to ϕ is total (i.e., the Π 0 2 soundness of T + tot(ϕ)). Note that in the Paris/Harrington result, the modified version of Ramsey's Theorem is equivalent to the Π 0 2 soundness of Peano Arithmetic (see [2, Theorem 3.1] ).
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we give some basic definitions and notation. In Section 3, we formally introduce and compare the three jump operators. In Section 4, we study the jump properties of Π 0 1 -degrees and link these degrees to the property of escaping every provably total function. In Section 5, we show the density of the p-degrees; in fact, given any two p-degrees [ϕ] < [ψ], we can find two incomparable p-degrees between them with meet [ϕ] and join [ψ] . In Section 6, we study the high/low hierarchy for both the hop and the jump. In Section 7, we study the cappable p-degrees. In Section 8, we show jump inversion for both the hop and the jump. In Section 9, we study the connection between lowness and highness on the one hand, and domination and escape properties of functions on the other. We conclude in Section 10 with some open questions.
Preliminaries and Notation
We fix a base theory T . It must be effectively axiomatizable and sound (i.e., arithmetic consequences of T are in TA). It must also be sufficiently strong for our purposes; Peano Arithmetic is more than enough. The axioms of a discretely ordered semiring (PA − ) plus Σ 0 1 -induction will always tacitly be assumed, and so T proves every true Σ 0 1 -sentence of first-order arithmetic. We use capital Roman letters for sentences and formulas in the language of T . We write P Q to mean that Q follows from T + P and s : "Q" to mean that s is (the Gödel number of) a proof of Q from T .
We use Greek letters for algorithms. Let {ϕ e } e∈ω be a standard list of algorithms. For an algorithm ϕ, we write tot(ϕ) for the sentence asserting the totality of ϕ. We define ϕ ≤ p ψ to mean that T tot(ψ) → tot(ϕ), and ϕ ≡ p ψ to mean that ϕ ≤ p ψ and ψ ≤ p ϕ. We use f, g and h for total functions on ω. It is important to keep a distinction between a total algorithm and the function it represents. Write ϕ ∼ ψ to mean that ϕ and ψ represent the same function. It is entirely possible that ϕ ∼ ψ but the totality of ψ is much stronger, from a proof-theoretic standpoint, than the totality of ϕ.
We adopt the convention from [1] that functions converge on initial segments, by simply not considering ϕ(x) to converge unless ϕ(y) has already converged for all y < x. This does not affect any of the conclusions, since (under Σ 0 1 -induction) being total under this modified notion of convergence is equivalent to being total under the usual notion. However, it simplifies a number of the arguments. There is a natural correspondence between Π 0 2 -sentences and algorithms. On the one hand, given an algorithm ϕ, the sentence tot(ϕ) is Π 0 2 . Conversely, given a Π 0 2 -sentence (∀x)(∃y) P (x, y), there is an algorithm ϕ that, on input x, outputs the least witness y to (∃y) P (x, y); the totality of this algorithm is provably equivalent to the original Π 0 2 -sentence. Moreover, the functions mapping between Gödel numbers of algorithms and Gödel numbers of the corresponding Π 0 2 -sentences are primitive recursive.
We enclose a mathematical statement in quotes to indicate a sentence in a formal language equivalent to the given statement. For example, we write "[ϕ] ≤ [ψ]" for the sentence Prov T (#(tot(ψ) → tot(ϕ))) in the language of arithmetic. (Here # denotes Gödel number and Prov T is a standard provability predicate for T .) This is much less cumbersome and more readable than carefully writing out the formal sentence, and it is usually obvious how to turn a mathematical idea into the corresponding formal sentence. We sometimes enclose what is already a sentence in a formal language in quotes to separate it from surrounding text. Since every sentence is equivalent to itself, this should not create any ambiguity. We also identify sentences with their Gödel numbers, and will, henceforth, omit any mention of the # function.
If ϕ is total, then the (provability) degree of ϕ is [ϕ] = {ψ : ϕ ≡ p ψ}. It is clear that ≤ p is degree invariant, so it induces an order on the provability degrees. The provability degrees form a distributive lattice with a least element 0 (the constant 0 function, computed by the obvious algorithm). The join and meet are given by the operations
(which converges on input x once ϕ(x) and ψ(x) have both converged) and
converges at stage s and ψ(x) did not converge at any stage t < s ψ(x) if ψ(x) converges at stage t and ϕ(x) did not converge at any stage s ≤ t (which converges on input x once either ϕ(x) or ψ(x) has converged). We use the symbols ∨ and ∧ for the join and meet. The reader should beware not to confuse these with disjunction and conjunction of Π 0 2 statements. Any of the results we prove in this paper hold for any theory T sufficient for our purposes (for example, IΣ 1 ). One important consequence is that for any total algorithm ϕ, the results also hold for the theory T + tot(ϕ). This gives a natural relativization of any result we prove to any provability degree [ϕ].
A hop, skip, and a jump
There are a few natural ways, given a provability degree [ψ], to produce a new provability degree [ψ] > [ψ] (or at least [ψ]
[ψ]). We call these operations the hop, the skip, and the jump. [1] ). Given an algorithm ψ, its jump ψ * is the algorithm
It is easy to see that ψ * p ψ, because ψ * ≡ p ψ * + 1 and ψ * + 1 differs from every ϕ e ≤ p ψ on any input that is a proof witnessing ϕ e ≤ p ψ. One can also show (Proposition 4.5 of [1] ) that the jump operator ψ → ψ * is (non-strict) orderpreserving for ≤ p . One consequence is that the jump is degree-invariant, and so [ψ] * = [ψ * ] is well-defined.
One helpful way to think about ψ * is as a single function that is universal for every θ ≤ p ψ. If θ ≤ p ψ, there is a provably total function f such that tot(θ) is equivalent to tot(ψ * • f ). Moreover, an index for f can be found uniformly from an index for θ and proof witnessing θ ≤ p ψ. (These results follow from Lemma 4.2 of [1] , and the Padding Lemma.) This gives a nice analogy between the jump function ψ * in this context and the jump function J A (e) = Φ A e (e) in computability theory, which is similarly universal for all partial A-computable functions. Thinking about ψ * this way makes it clear that ψ * > p ψ for every total algorithm ψ.
Another helpful way to think about ψ * is that tot(0 * ) is equivalent to soundness of T for Π 0 2 -statements (see also Proposition 4.3 of [1] ). That is, T + tot(0 * ) proves "for every Π 0 2 sentence P , (Prov T (P ) → P )." More generally, tot(ψ * ) is equivalent to soundness of T +tot(ψ) for Π 0 2 -statements. This is because of the correspondence between Π 0 2 -statements and algorithms, and the fact that the totality of ψ * is equivalent to the uniform totality of all T + tot(ψ)-provably total algorithms. Definition 3.2. Given an algorithm ψ, its skip is the algorithm
We define [ψ] con = [con(ψ)].
We use the notation con(ψ) because T proves tot(con(ψ)) ⇐⇒ "T + tot(ψ) is consistent."
Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem implies that con(ψ) p ψ for every total algorithm ψ. It is easy to see that the con operator is order preserving for ≤ p , which implies that con is degree invariant and so [ψ] con = [con(ψ)] is well-defined.
Unlike the jump of ψ, which is always strictly above ψ, the skip of ψ may be either above ψ or off to the side (hence the name "skip"). For this reason we also define the "hop" as a strictly increasing version of skip. Definition 3.3. Given an algorithm ψ, its hop is the algorithm ψ • = ψ con(ψ).
It is easy to see that ψ < p ψ • for every total algorithm ψ, and that the operator ψ → ψ • is (non-strict) order-preserving and hence degree-invariant. Define [ψ] • = [ψ • ]. A hop is a small jump, and indeed for every total ψ, we have ψ < p ψ • < p ψ * . We prove that ψ • ≤ p ψ * in this section; in the next section, we will show that the inequality is strict. Proof. Since ψ ≤ p ψ * , it suffices to show that con(ψ) ≤ p ψ * . Fix an algorithm ϕ e that T -provably never halts (on any input). We argue within T , by contrapositive:
Suppose that con(ψ) is not total. Since tot(con(ψ)) is equivalent to the consistency of T + tot(ψ), there is a T -proof p 1 : "tot(ψ) → 0 = 1." Furthermore, since T proves 0 = 1 and all propositional validities, there is a T -proof p 2 : "0 = 1 → tot(ϕ e )." By adjoining p 1 and p 2 , there is a T -proof x : " tot(ψ) → tot(ϕ e ), " so ψ * (x) = ϕ e (x) ↑, and hence ψ * is non-total. Therefore T tot(ψ * ) → tot(ψ • ).
As we did in the proof of the above lemma, we sometimes need to argue within the theory T . (When we are arguing within some formal theory, we will indent the internal argument.) For that reason, we will need to show that some of the inequalities between various provability degrees mentioned in this section are provable in T or extensions of T , so that we may use this fact when we argue internally in T in proofs in later sections. We will not worry about what base theory is necessary to prove the results of this paper, except when this is necessary so that a result may be used internally inside a later argument. Lemma 3.5. For every total algorithm ψ, the theory T + tot(con(ψ)) suffices to prove "ψ * p ψ." Proof. Let ϕ e = ψ * + 1. We argue within T :
Suppose there is a T -proof of tot(ψ) → tot(ψ * ). Then there is a T -proof of tot(ψ) → tot(ϕ e ), and hence T proves
Therefore, T proves that if ψ is total, then (∃x) ψ * (x) = ϕ e (x) = ψ * (x) + 1. Hence T + tot(ψ) ¬(tot(ψ * )). Putting this together with the T -proof of tot(ψ) → tot(ψ * ), we have a T + tot(ψ)-proof of an inconsistency. Consider the following algorithm:φ, on input x, searches for the least s such that (1) ϕ(x) converges in at most s steps, or (2) ¬P (s). If (1) holds, thenφ(x) = ϕ(x); if (2) holds,φ(x) = 0.
Π
Thenφ ∼ ϕ because P (s) holds for all s, and T proves thatφ is total. Hence T proves the totality of the functionφ + 1, which dominates ϕ.
Next we show that if [ϕ] is non-escaping, then [ϕ] is bounded by a Π 0 1 -degree. Suppose [ϕ] is non-escaping, and let ψ be a provably total algorithm for a function that bounds the computing time function of ϕ. Now consider the sentence:
This is a true Π 0 1 -sentence and clearly implies the totality of ϕ. 
is provably equivalent to a (true) Σ 0 2 -sentence. (Note that it is already in the form of a Π 0 2 -sentence.) Clearly, every Π 0 1 -degree is ∆ 0 2 . It is also easy to see:
Assume that if tot(ϕ) is true and is provably equivalent to (∃y)(∀x) P (y, x) over T . Fix y such that (∀x) P (y, x); this is a true Π 0 1 -statement and T proves (∀x) P (y, x) =⇒ tot(ϕ).
We show in Proposition 10.3 that there is a ∆ 0 2 -degree that is not Π 0 1 . On the other hand, we will see in Corollary 6.7 that not every degree bounded by a Π 0 1 -degree is ∆ 0 2 . Key to the proof will be the following result, which puts an important limitation on the behavior of ∆ 0 2 -degrees.
. Proof. Arguing in T + tot(0 * ) + tot(ψ), we will show that ψ * is total. That is, we must show that for every e, if T tot(ψ) → tot(ϕ e ) then ϕ e is total. Let Q = (∃y)(∀s) P (y, s) be a true Σ 0 2 -statement that is provably equivalent to tot(ψ). We begin the internal argument in T + tot(0 * ) + tot(ψ):
Fix e, s where s : " tot(ψ) → tot(ϕ e )." Defineφ e as follows. On input x, search for the least t such that (1) ϕ e (x) converges in at most t steps, or (2) (∀y ≤ x)(∃s ≤ t)¬P (y, s). Letφ e (x) be either ϕ e (x) or 0, respectively.
Because T proves tot(ϕ e ) or (∀y)(∃s)¬P (y, s), it also proves thatφ e is total. This implies (by tot(0 * ), which is equivalent to soundness of T for Π 0 2 -sentences) thatφ e is total. But we are assuming tot(ψ), which is equivalent to Q, so there is a y such that (∀s) P (y, s). For all x ≥ y, ϕ e (x) converges if and only if ϕ e (x) does, so ϕ e is total.
The reverse inequality is obvious.
Note that the proof actually shows that T + tot(0 * ) proves that for every ∆ 0
The following lemma is well known.
The sentence ¬P is Σ 0 1 , and so T ¬P → Prov T (¬P ), or, equivalently, T ¬P → ¬ Con T (P ). Now take the contrapositive.
Restating this result in the language of provability degrees, we have:
Density theorems
The Skull Action. There is a recurring idea in the proofs in this section and later on, when we want to ensure [ψ] [ϕ] for some ψ we build. If [ψ] ≤ [ϕ], then there is a proof s : "tot(ϕ) → tot(ψ)." Using the Recursion Theorem, the algorithm for ψ can know its own index, so can identify a proof of this form. When it sees such a proof, it can replace ψ with some algorithm θ that we know is not below ϕ. We threaten action θ : For all inputs x on which the algorithm ψ(x) has not already converged, we simply copy θ, i.e., we set ψ(x) = θ(x) for these x. If we take action θ , it creates a contradiction, because then [ψ] = [θ]. So merely by threatening to perform action θ in the construction of ψ, without carrying it out, we ensure that
Similarly, if we want to ensure [ψ] [ϕ] for some ψ we build, we can threaten action θ for some [θ] [ϕ]. In this latter case, we often choose θ to be the constant 0 function (computed with the obvious algorithm). For this reason, action 0 occurs frequently. We also refer to action 0 as annihilating ψ. The first two theorems where this idea occurs are about the density of the p-degrees. We prove both theorems (though the first is a corollary of the second) since they are interesting for other reasons. 
Proof. Construction of ψ:
At stage s, if s : "tot(ψ) → tot(ϕ)," then annihilate ψ. If s : "tot(ψ)," then perform action ϕ . Otherwise, define ψ(s) = 1.
Verification:
At every stage s, depending on some primitive recursive condition (whether there is some p ≤ s that is a proof of one of two fixed sentences), ψ(s) outputs either 0, 1, or copies ϕ(s). Hence T proves tot(ϕ) → tot(ψ), i.e., [ Relativizing this theorem, we obtain full density as a corollary.
By Theorem 4.3, the function ψ constructed in the proof of Theorem 5.1 is nonescaping; the true Π 0 1 -sentence that implies that ψ is total is P = "action ϕ is never taken." In fact, tot(ψ) is equivalent to (P or tot(ϕ)). Therefore, if ϕ has Π 0 1 or ∆ 0 2 -degree, then so does ψ. This proves that there is no minimal nonzero Π 0 1 -degree, and no minimal nonzero ∆ 0 2 -degree. Relativizing, we obtain: Corollary 5.3. The Π 0 1 -degrees are dense as a substructure:
Similarly, the ∆ 0 2 -degrees are dense as a substructure.
On the other hand, if we replaced 1 with ϕ(s) in the definition of ψ in Theorem 5.1, then it would still be the case that [0] < [ψ] < [ϕ], but now ϕ would be non-escaping relative to ψ. This is because for this modified construction, tot(ϕ) follows from tot(ψ) and the true Π 0 1 -statement "ψ is never annihilated." Theorem 5.4. Given any nonzero [ϕ], there is a pair of nonzero degrees
is a join of a minimal pair.
Proof. Construction:
At stage s we have defined ψ 0 (x) and ψ 1 (y) for x < s and y < y s , respectively. There are two basic steps taken at stage s:
(1) If s : "tot(ψ 0 ) → tot(ψ 1 )," then annihilate ψ 0 and perform action ϕ on ψ 1 . If s : "tot(ψ 1 ) → tot(ψ 0 )," then perform action ϕ on ψ 0 and annihilate ψ 1 . (2) Wait for ϕ(s) to converge. While this waiting is taking place, define ψ 1 (y s ) = 0, and ψ 1 (r) = 0 for each r > y s such that ϕ(s) does not converge in r steps. If such t is found, define ψ 0 (s) = ϕ(s), and y s+1 = t. 2 We could make the construction symmetric by alternating the roles of ψ 0 and ψ 1 in the construction at alternate stages, but this is not required.
By inspecting the algorithm used to define ψ 0 and ψ 1 , it is clear that so long as ϕ is total, ψ 0 and ψ 1 are both total. In fact, this can be proven in T , so
It is clear that if both algorithms are total, then we cannot permanently stay in the step (2) at any stage of the construction. Then by an easy case analysis, ϕ must also be total, which means
Similarly, one of the two functions is always copying the 0 function, so T can prove that on every input at least one of the two algorithms converges.
By Theorem 4.3, the function ψ 1 constructed in this proof is non-escaping, and ϕ is non-escaping relative to ψ 0 . This is because the true Π 0 1 -sentence that implies that ψ 1 is total says that "no action is ever taken"; and the same sentence implies that ψ 0 is total if and only if ϕ is total.
6. The high/low hierarchy Definition 6.1. We denote by ϕ (n) (or [ϕ] (n) ) the nth iterate of the jump operator applied to ϕ (or [ϕ], respectively).
and [0 * ] but neither high n nor low n for every n. We write low and high rather than low 1 and high 1 . (We can make sense of low 0 and high 0 as meaning provably-total and ≥ p 0 * , respectively.) Theorem 6.2. The high/low hierarchy is strict, and there are intermediate degrees. Proof. Fix n ≥ 0. We first define an algorithm ψ ∈ high n+1 high n :
Clearly [ψ] ≤ [0] * . If ψ were high n , there would be a proof s : "tot(ψ (n) ) → tot(0 (n+1) )," that implies that ψ is provably total, and therefore not high n .
By Lemma 3.5, T + tot(con(0 (n) )) is sufficient to show that [0] (n+1)
[0] (n) . Therefore, T + tot(con(0 (n) )) suffices to prove that annihilation never occurs. This
The degree [con(0 (n) )] is Π 0 1 , so by Corollary 4.10, we have
The construction for low n+1 low n is a dual construction switching 0 * and 0:
Again, it is clear that [ψ] ≤ [0 * ] and [ψ] is not low n . To see that [ψ] is low n+1 , again we use the fact that T + tot(con(0 (n) )) proves [0] (n+1) [0] (n) . This implies that [ψ] ≤ [con(0 (n) )], because [con(0 (n) )] proves that the first case in the definition of ψ can never occur. Thus we have [ψ] ≤ [0 * ] ∧ [con(0 (n) )], and hence
We can think of the properly high n+1 degree as simply copying 0 * while threatening annihilation if a witness is ever found that it is high n . Similarly, the properly low n+1 degree copies 0, while threatening 0 * if a witness is ever found that it is low n . To construct an intermediate ψ, we combine both threats.
At stage s, assuming that we have not already performed a action, we check whether s is a proof of tot(ψ (n) ) → tot(0 (n+1) ) or tot(0 (n) ) → tot(ψ (n) ) for some n.
If it is, we perform action 0 (in the first case) or 0 * (in the second) on ψ. Otherwise, we define ψ(s) = ϕ(s). By the same arguments as above, [ψ] ≤ [0 * ], and [ψ] is not low n or high n for any n.
The nature of the intermediate degree we construct depends on which function ϕ we copy (while threatening actions). If we copy 0, then the constructed intermediate degree is non-escaping (since its totality is provable from the true Π 0 1 -sentence saying that no action occurs). If we copy 0 * , then [0 * ] is non-escaping relative to the constructed intermediate degree (since tot(0 * ) is provable from tot(ψ) plus the true Π 0 1 -sentence saying that annihilation never happens). These two facts will be useful later. Two sequences of degrees. In addition to the properly high n+1 , properly low n+1 , and intermediate degrees constructed in the proof of Theorem 6.2, one important sequence of degrees made an appearance: degrees of the form [0] * ∧ [con(0 (n) )]. These degrees, and their complements, have some interesting properties. Definition 6.4. Let π n = [0] * ∧[con(0 (n) )]. We additionally define its complement, which we call π n . We would like to define π n as [0] * ∧ [¬ con(0 (n) )]. Since con(0 (n) ) is a Π 0 1 -sentence, its negation is provably equivalent to totality of some partial computable function, which we will call ¬ con(0 (n) ). This function is not total, and hence does not belong to the structure we are studying. So we actually define π n = [0 * ¬ con(0 (n) )], which is almost the same thing.
Observations.
• The sequence π n is increasing.
• The sequence π n is decreasing. • π n and π n are complements to each other below [0] * , i.e., π n ∨ π n = [0] * and π n ∧ π n = [0].
Theorem 6.5. Every π n is low n+1 but not low n , and every π n is high n+1 but not high n .
Proof. When π n first made an appearance, in the proof of Theorem 6.2, we proved that it was low n+1 and above the properly low n+1 degree we constructed, so π n is properly low n+1 .
For
π n , notice that [con(0 (n) )] ∨ π n ≥ [0] * . By taking the n + 1-st jumps of both sides and using Corollary 4.10, we see that [con(0 (n) )] ∨ π (n+1) n
To see that π n is not high n , we again refer back to Theorem 6.2. Let ψ be the properly high n+1 degree constructed in the proof of that theorem. We argued that [0] * ≤ [ψ] ∨ [con(0 (n) )], which means that the totality of ψ and con(0 (n) ) together imply tot(0 * ). Equivalently, the totality of ψ implies either 0 * is total, or T + tot(0 (n) ) is inconsistent. So π n ≤ [ψ], which we already know is not high n .
Theorem 6.6. π 1 bounds every Π 0 1 -degree below [0] * .
Proof. Let P be a Π 0 1 -sentence provable from tot(0 * ). We argue within T , by contrapositive:
All true Σ 0 1 -sentences are provable (verifying the witness constitutes a proof), so if ¬P , then T proves ¬P . Furthermore, T +tot(0 * ) proves P , so ¬P → ¬ con(0 * ). Thus T + con(0 * ) P and T + tot(0 * ) P , thus T + tot(π 1 ) P .
The previous result is the reason for the name π 1 . However, it should be noted that π 1 is not itself Π 0 1 , or even ∆ 0 2 .
Corollary 6.7. There is a non-escaping degree that is not ∆ 0 2 .
Proof. We claim that π 1 has the desired properties. It is below the Π 0 1 -degree [con(0 * )], so it is non-escaping. Assume that π 1 is ∆ 0 2 . By Theorem 4.9, it is low, so π con 1 ≤ π * 1 ≤ [0] * . But π con 1 is Π 0 1 , so π con 1 ≤ π 1 by Theorem 6.6, contradicting Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem.
Proof. This follows from direct calculation using the distributive property of our lattice:
One consequence is that, even though π 1 is low 2 , a single hop is sufficient to take it outside the cone below [0] * . Interestingly, π 1 hops inside [0] * . Proposition 6.9. π con 1 = 0 • and so π Proof. Since T + (A or B) is consistent if and only if T + A or T + B is consistent, con( π 1 ) is equivalent to con(0 * ) or Con T (¬ con(0 * )). We claim Con T (¬ con(0 * )) is equivalent to con(0); the result follows. Obviously Con T (¬ con(0 * )) implies con(0). For the other direction, Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem tells us that con(0) implies Con T (¬ con(0)), and the latter implies Con T (¬ con(0 * )). As a result, ∆ 0 2 -degrees are definable from Π 0 1 -degrees. We saw in the previous section that π 1 is not ∆ 0 2 , so it cannot be complementable to con(0 * ). In particular, the degrees below con(0 * ) do not form a boolean algebra. . Then 0 * ϕ + 1 is provably total, and by padding, there are infinitely many proofs s of tot(0 * ϕ + 1). For every such s, 0 * (s) is defined to be (0 * ϕ + 1)(s). The algorithm that 0 * follows on such input s is (first decode the proof, then) wait for a stage when either 0 * (s) or ϕ(s) converges, and then add one to that value. It cannot be the case that 0 * (s) converges first, otherwise 0 * (s) = 0 * (s) + 1, so ϕ(s) must converge. Therefore, we have infinitely many arguments where 0 * is copying ϕ + 1. We can carry out the above argument in T + tot(0 * ), which shows that Proof. We define a function ψ so that ψ( p, x ) = ϕ e (x) if p : " tot(ψ ϕ e )" and there is no q ≤ p with q : " tot(ψ) → tot(0 * )", and ψ( p, x ) = 0 otherwise. In other words, if we witness a proof that ψ ϕ e is total, we code ϕ e into a column of ψ, but if we ever witness a proof that [0 * ] ≤ [ψ], we stop any future coding of new functions (while continuing to code any functions we already started coding).
Cappability
To see that [ψ] ≤ [0] * , we argue inside T +tot(0 * ) (which, recall, proves Π 0 2 -soundness for T ):
Suppose that ψ is not total. For all e, by Π 0 2 -soundness, if T proves tot(ψ ϕ e ), then ψ ϕ e is total, which means ϕ e must be total (since we are assuming ψ is not). So for every p and x, either ψ( p, x ) = 0, or ψ( p, x ) = ϕ e (x) for some total function ϕ e . Therefore, ψ is total.
To see that [ψ] < [0] * , suppose to the contrary there is a q such that q : " tot(ψ) → tot(0 * )". Then ψ is equivalent to a finite join of the functions ϕ e that the construction began coding before finding q. The totality of each such ϕ e is provable from the totality of ψ, which means that each such ϕ e is provably total (because we have a proof of tot(ψ) or tot(ϕ e )). So ψ is provably total, but then it cannot prove the totality of 0 * .
By the same argument, for each e such that T proves tot(ψ ϕ e ), ϕ e is always below ψ and so provably total. This shows that ψ is not cappable.
Inverting jumps
In this structure, we have defined two natural jump-like operators (strictly increasing and degree invariant). We have called these the jump and the hop. In this section, we prove the existence of both jump-inverses and hop-inverses. We also prove the existence of skip-inverses. We even prove a form of pseudo-jump inversion. For the hop, the inverse has a natural self-referential definition. Suppose that T + tot(θ) is inconsistent. Then there is some p : " tot(θ) → 0 = 1", so there is a stage s such that for all x < p, θ(x) has converged by stage s, and for all x ≥ p, θ(x) is just the straightforward 0 algorithm. So T proves tot(θ), which means that T itself is inconsistent, a contradiction.
For the skip, notice that a skip is automatically Π 0 1 and above [con(0)], and so we can only possibly find skip-inverses for these degrees:
Proof. Assume that T proves ϕ ↔ (∀n) P (n), where P has only bounded quantification. Define θ as follows. On input n, we diverge if θ has diverged on any previous input (as usual). If not, we check if there is a p ≤ n such that p : " tot(θ) → 0 = 1". If so, we perform action 0 . (In other words, we declare that θ(s) ↓= 0 for all s ≥ n.) If no such p has yet been found, we let θ(n)↓ iff P (n).
Note that we can computably determine if θ(n)↓, so tot(θ) is Π 0 1 . We claim that con(θ) ≡ p (θ + con(0)) ≡ p ϕ.
First, arguing in T + Con(T ):
If action 0 occurs, then T proves tot(θ). But the action's occurrence implies that T + tot(θ) is inconsistent, hence so is T . This is a contradiction, so action 0 never occurs. Therefore, θ is total if and only ϕ is total. This shows that θ + con(0) ≥ p ϕ. We assumed that ϕ ≥ p con(0), so we also have ϕ ≥ p θ. Therefore, θ + con(0) ≡ p ϕ.
Now argue in T + Con(T ) + tot(θ): Assume ¬ con(θ). Then there is a least p such that p : " tot(θ) → 0 = 1". The only obstacle to performing action 0 at stage n = p would be if θ diverged on an earlier input. But we know tot(θ), so we must perform action 0 . We have already seen that this leads to a contradiction, hence con(θ). This shows that θ + con(0) ≥ p con(θ). Since θ is Π 0 1 , we know that con(θ) ≥ p θ. Therefore, θ + con(0) ≡ p con(θ). Putting everything together, con(θ) ≡ p ϕ.
For the proof of jump inversion, the key idea is simply to wait, whenever we see some [ϕ e ] ≤ [θ], for ϕ e to give some evidence of totality, by converging on a new input. In the meantime, we ensure that the only way θ can fail to be total is if ϕ e eventually provides this evidence. Proof. We will construct the jump-inverse θ. The construction of θ is divided into two types of stages, type I stages and type II stages. Stage 0 is a type I stage.
(1) If t is a type I stage, we define θ(t) = ϕ(t), and consider the least p not already considered. If p : " tot(θ) → tot(ϕ e )", then t + 1 is a type (II, e) stage; otherwise, t + 1 is type I. (2) If t is a type (II, e) stage, let s be the most recent type I stage. We define θ(t) = 0. If ϕ e (s)↓ by stage t, then t + 1 is type I. Otherwise, t + 1 is type (II, e). Recall our convention that functions converge on initial segments, so to prove totality of ϕ, it suffices to show that ϕ converges on infinitely many inputs. To show that θ * is above ϕ, it suffices to show that θ * can prove the existence of infinitely many type I stages. We argue in T + tot(θ * ):
Suppose that we enter a type (II, e) stage from a type I stage at stage s + 1. Then T + tot(θ) proves tot(ϕ e ). By Π 0 2 -soundness, ϕ e is total, so ϕ e (s) converges, and we eventually enter another type I stage. Hence there are infinitely many type I stages. To show that ϕ is above θ * , we argue in T + tot(ϕ) (using T + tot(ϕ) tot 0 * ):
Suppose there is some least pair (s, e) such that s : " tot(θ) → tot(ϕ e )" but ϕ e (s)↑. Then the construction enters a type (II, e) stage at stage s + 1, and then never leaves type (II, e) stages. This means θ is total, because for x > s, θ(x) simply outputs another 0 as we search for a stage x where ϕ e (s)↓, which does not exist. By simply monitoring the construction for the first s + 1 stages, T can prove ϕ e (s)↓ or tot(θ).
Since T also proves tot(θ) → tot(ϕ e ), we have T ϕ e (s) ↓ (since either it converges or ϕ e is total). By Π 0 2 -soundness, ϕ e (s) converges, contradicting our choice of (s, e).
By induction, for all s, if s : " tot(θ) → tot(ϕ e )" then ϕ e (s)↓. If there is one proof, there are infinitely many, so in fact if T + tot(θ) proves tot(ϕ e ) then ϕ e is total. Thus θ * is total.
Using the same idea to construct two functions, we can find a pair of low degrees whose join is [0] * . Proof. We will construct ψ 0 and ψ 1 . The construction is divided into three types of stages, type I stages, type II stages for ψ 0 , and type II stages for ψ 1 . Stage 0 is a type I stage.
(1) If t is a type I stage, we define ψ 0 (s) = ψ 1 (s) = 0 for all s ≤ t where these are not already defined. We consider the least p not already considered. If p : " tot(ψ i ) → tot(ϕ e )" for some i ≤ 1, then t + 1 is a type (II, e) stage for ψ i ; otherwise, t + 1 is type I. (2) If t is a type (II, e) stage for ψ i , let s be the most recent type I stage. We define ψ i (t) = 0, and leave ψ 1−i (t) undefined. If ϕ e (s)↓ by stage t, then t + 1 is type I. Otherwise, t + 1 is type (II, e) for ψ i . The jumps of [ψ 0 ] and [ψ 1 ] are below [0] * by the same argument as in the proof of jump inversion. To see that their join is [0] * , notice that both being total means that we never stay in a type II stage forever, and so every 0-provably total function is total, which implies that 0 * is total. To see that their meet is [0], notice that every stage t is type I (in which case ψ 0 (t) and ψ 1 (t) are both defined) or type II for some ψ i (in which case ψ i (t) is defined).
Relativizing this theorem allows us to combine jump inversion with lower-cone avoidance. The following theorem gives us a form of pseudo-jump inversion.
Theorem 8.6. Given a computable function ψ such that
for every index i (in particular, if ϕ i is total, then so is ϕ ψ(i) ), there is always an index e such that [ϕ ψ(e) ] = [0] * .
Proof. We will construct ϕ e . Again, there are two types of stages. At a type I stage s, we code ϕ e (s) = 0 * (s), and then switch to a type II stage. At a type II stage x (with s as the most recent type I stage), we define ϕ e (x) = 0 and check whether ϕ ψ(e) (s) converges at stage x. If not, the next stage is also type II. If it does converge, the next stage is type I.
For all x, ϕ e (x) copies either 0 * (x) or the zero function, so [ϕ e ] ≤ [0] * . Moreover, if ϕ ψ(e) and ϕ e are both total, then the construction is never stuck in a type II stage, so there are infinitely many type I stages, and 0 * is also total. Since [ϕ e ] ≤ [ϕ ψ(e) ], this shows that [0 * ] ≤ [ϕ ψ(e) ].
It remains to show [ϕ ψ(e) ] ≤ [0] * . Fix a proof p : " tot(ϕ * e ) → tot(ϕ ψ(e) )". We argue in T + tot(0 * ):
The construction is never stuck in a type I stage, and so it suffices to show that every sequence of consecutive type II stages is terminated by a type I stage. Let X s,k be the formalized Π 0 1 -sentence saying "s is a type I stage, the code of the computation process through the first s stages is k, and ϕ ψ(e) (s) diverges," and let χ s,k be the corresponding computable function (using the correspondence between Π 0 2 -sentences and functions that maps between true sentences and total functions). This sentence clearly implies that ϕ e is total, because it implies that the construction of ϕ e becomes stuck in type II stages after stage s, and so ϕ e (x) = 0 for all x > s.
Suppose that for some pair s, k, the sentence X s,k is true (χ s,k is total). Then χ * s,k is also total (cf. the note following Theorem 4.9), and hence ϕ * e is total. Otherwise, X s,k is false for all s, k. This implies that the construction is never stuck in type II stages, and hence ϕ ψ(e) is total. The above is a proof that totality of 0 * implies that either ϕ * e is total, or ϕ ψ(e) is total. Adjoining the proof p, we obtain a proof that tot(0 * ) implies tot(ϕ ψe ).
One might imagine that for this theorem to be true we would need uniformity of proofs witnessing ϕ e ≤ p ϕ ψ(e) ≤ p ϕ * e , or else provable totality of ψ, but neither is required. On the other hand, like most of the proofs in this paper (with the notable exception of Corollary 8.5), the proof of Theorem 8.6 is uniform: e can be found uniformly from an index for ψ and an index for the enumeration of T .
We end the section with an application of Theorem 8.6 completely analogous to Jockusch and Shore's first application of pseudo-jump inversion [3] . Continuing in this way, we could show that the high/low hierarchy is strict below [0] * , reproving all of Theorem 6.2 except the existence of intermediate degrees.
Jump classes and domination properties
A natural question arising in our study of the provability degrees is the relationship between escape and domination notions, on the one hand, and the jump classes on the other. In part, this is inspired by Martin's high-domination theorem from computability. In part, it is inspired by the fact that every Π 0 1 -degree is GL 1 (Theorem 4.9), which implies that non-escaping degrees must also be weak in the sense of the jump hierarchy because of the characterization of non-escaping degrees (Theorem 4.3). However, we will see that in the setting of the provability degrees, the relationship between these two notions is actually quite weak. In fact, the only interactions are the ones that follow from Π 0 1 -degrees being GL 1 . The escape and domination notions we study are "escaping", defined in Section 4, along with "dominant" and "full", defined here. 
Proof. We start by showing that (1), (2) and (3) All that remains is to show that (4) is equivalent to the others. Clearly, (1) implies (4) . Now assume (4) . There is a primitive recursive (hence provably total) function γ such that, for every algorithm ϕ e , the function ϕ γ(e) is defined by ϕ γ(e) (x) = (µs)(∀y < x) ϕ e,s (y)↓ .
Furthermore, there is another primitive recursive function τ such that if p is a proof of tot(ϕ e ), then τ (p) is a proof of tot(ϕ γ(e) ), and τ (p) > p.
Let Q be the sentence, "for all p, e and s, if p is a proof of tot(ϕ e ) and ξ(τ (p)) converges to s, then ϕ e,s (p) converges." This sentence is clearly Π 0 1 , and is true because if p is a proof of tot(ϕ e ), then ϕ e and ϕ γ(e) are total, τ (p) is a proof of tot(ϕ γ(e) ), and so ξ(τ (p)) = 0 * (τ (p)) = ϕ γ(e) (τ (p)) ≥ t, where t is the number of stages for ϕ e (p) to converge. Furthermore, Q and tot(ξ) together imply the totality of 0 * , since 0 * is equivalent to Π 0 2 -soundness of T . This implies (2).
The following diagram summarizes the relationship between the jump classes and our escape/domination notions: The second claim is a dual version. Given a non-escaping ψ, we can find a Π 0 1 -degree θ that bounds it. Then we know that [θ] (n) ≤ [0] (n) ∨ [θ], so [θ] (n) cannot be above [0] (n+1) for the same reason as above.
In addition, by Corollary 6.3, we know that being full does not imply high n , and being non-escaping does not imply low n . It remains to show that high degrees may not be dominant, and that dominant degrees may be low. These two results are the most complicated ones in the paper. (This will then imply that the right column implications are strict, because the property of being dominant is incomparable with anything from the left column.) Theorem 9.4. There is a low degree that is dominant.
Proof. We will construct an algorithm θ such that [θ] is low and dominant. The construction is a modification of the jump inversion construction used in the proof of Theorem 8.3, with top degree [0] * . We modify the type II stages to additionally ensure that the jump-inverse θ being constructed is dominant, and we do so by outputting, instead of 0, the maximum of the first k provably total functions, where k gradually increases over time.
The construction of θ is divided into two types of stages, type I stages and type II stages. Stage 0 is a type I stage. Initially, the function number is 0.
(1) If t is a type I stage, we define θ(t) = 0 * (t), and consider the least p not already considered. If p : " tot(θ) → tot(ϕ e )", then t + 1 is a type (II, e) stage; otherwise, we increment the function number, and stage t + 1 is type I. (2) If t is a type (II, e) stage, let s be the most recent type I stage. We define θ(t) to be the max of the first k provably total functions, where k is the current function number. If ϕ e (s)↓ by stage t, then t+1 is type I. Otherwise, t + 1 is type (II, e). The argument that [θ] is low is identical to the argument that ϕ is above θ * in the proof of jump inversion. The only difference is instead of copying the 0 function, we copy the max of the first k provably total functions. But since T + tot(0 * ) is equivalent to T together with Π 0 2 -soundness of T , in the internal argument we know that these functions are actually total, so that is no obstacle.
To show that θ is dominant, consider the functionθ defined byθ(x) = θ(s), where s is the x th type II stage in the construction of θ. The totality of θ implies that there are infinitely many type II stages in the construction of θ (since there are infinitely many proofs of totality of some function), and hence thatθ is also total. Butθ(x) is defined as the max of the first k provably total functions, where k depends on x and k → ∞ as x → ∞, soθ is dominant.
Theorem 9.5. There is a high degree that is not dominant.
Proof. Using the Recursion Theorem, we will simultaneously construct an algorithm θ such that [θ] is high, and a computable function γ such that if [ϕ e ] ≤ [θ], then ϕ γ(e) is provably total and escapes ϕ e (thus ensuring that θ is non-dominant). There are three types of stages, type I stages, type II stages, and transition stages, with stage 0 being a transition stage. At type I stages we ensure [θ] is non-dominant, and at type II stages we follow a jump inversion strategy to make [θ] high. Transition stages just serve to decide whether the next stage should be type I or type II.
Construction of θ:
(1) If t is a transition stage, we define θ(t) = 0, and we consider the least proof p not already considered such that p : " tot(θ) → tot(ϕ e )" or p : " tot(0 * ) → tot(ϕ e )". In the first case, stage t + 1 is a type (I, e) stage. In the second case, stage t + 1 is a type (II, e) stage. (2) If t is a type (I, e) stage, let s be the most recent transition stage. We define θ(t) = 0. If ϕ γ(e),t (x)↓> ϕ e,t (x)↓ for some x ∈ (s, t), then stage t + 1 is a transition stage. Otherwise, stage t + 1 is a type (I, e) stage. (3) If t is a type (II, e) stage, let s be the most recent transition stage. We define θ(t) = 0 * (t). If ϕ e,t (s)↓, then t + 1 is a transition stage. Otherwise, t + 1 is type a (II, e) stage. This construction may be carried out by a Turing machine, of course, but the "stages" of the construction will not correspond to stages of the Turing machine executing the construction. We call the stages of the Turing machine execution "beats" to distinguish them from construction "stages". This is important because T can prove that there are infinitely many beats, but the statement that there are infinitely many stages is equivalent (over T ) to the totality of θ.
Construction of γ:
The function γ is defined so that, for all e, ϕ γ(e) is the function
converges before there is a beat > x of the construction not in a type (I, e) stage 0 otherwise.
Verification:
We first prove that the construction is never stuck in type I or type II, i.e., that there are infinitely many transition stages. In fact, we will carry out this proof in T + tot(θ * ), because we will need the fact later that T + tot(θ * ) proves the existence of infinitely many transition stages.
Suppose that the construction becomes stuck in type (I, e) stages at beat s. Then afterwards ϕ γ(e) (s) cannot be defined by the second case of its definition. Therefore ϕ γ(e) (s) converges if and only if ϕ e (s) converges, and ϕ γ(e) (s) = ϕ e (s) + 1. Also, there is a proof p : " tot(θ) → tot(ϕ e )". By Π 0 2 -soundness of T + tot(θ), the algorithm ϕ e is actually total. So ϕ e (s) does converge, and ϕ γ(e) (s) = ϕ e (s) + 1. This implies that some x will eventually be found causing the construction to return to a transition stage, so it was not, in fact, stuck in type (I, e).
Suppose the construction becomes stuck in type (II, e) stages at stage s + 1. Then there is a proof p : " tot(0 * ) → tot(ϕ e )", but ϕ e (s)↑. Furthermore, by monitoring the first s stages of the construction, T can prove that stage s + 1 of the construction is type (II, e), and therefore that either ϕ e (s)↓ or tot(θ) ⇔ tot(0 * ). So T + tot(θ) proves ϕ e (s)↓ or tot(0 * ), and must therefore also prove ϕ e (s)↓ or tot(ϕ e ) (by adjoining the proof p). Therefore, T + tot(θ) proves that ϕ e (s) converges. By Π 0 2 -soundness of this theory, ϕ e (s) actually converges, at which point there will be a transition stage. The above shows that [0] * * ≤ [θ] * , because each proof p : " tot(0 * ) → tot(ϕ e )" puts the construction into a type (II, e) stage, so for the construction to return to a transition stage infinitely often guarantees that ϕ e (x) converges for infinitely many x, which means that ϕ e is total (by our convention that functions converge on initial segments). Clearly [θ] ≤ [0] * , so [θ] is high.
To show that [θ] is non-dominant, we consider some ϕ e ≤ p θ. There are infinitely many type (I, e) stages and infinitely many transition stages, so ϕ γ(e) escapes ϕ e . We must now argue in T that ϕ γ(e) is total, using our fixed proof that if θ is total, so is ϕ e :
If there are infinitely many beats of the construction that are not in type (I, e) stages, then ϕ γ(e) is clearly total. Suppose instead that all beats of the construction after beat t are type (I, e). Each of these stages takes finitely many beats, because the construction only has to check for finitely many x whether ϕ γ(e),t (x)↓> ϕ e,t (x)↓. So there are infinitely many stages of the construction, hence θ is total. This implies that ϕ e is total, which in turn implies that ϕ γ(e) is total.
Open Questions
The Π 0 1 -degrees came up naturally in our study of the provability degrees, specifically in the characterization of non-escaping. The ∆ 0 2 -degrees also proved useful, though their role is less clear. What else can be said about the ∆ 0 2 -degrees and their relationship to the Π 0 1 -degrees? For example: Question 10.1. Is there a ∆ 0 2 -degree that bounds no nonzero Π 0 1 -degree? Question 10.2. Is every ∆ 0 2 degree that is below [0 * ] also below π 1 ? To help motivate these questions, note that properly ∆ 0 2 degrees do exist: Proposition 10.3. There is a ∆ 0 2 -degree that is not Π 0 1 . Proof. Construct a computable function f as follows: Output 0 until we find a stage s such that s : "lim t→∞ f (t) = 0 ↔ P," for some Π 0 1 -statement P . Once we find such an s, and until we find that P is false (which if it is, we would eventually see because P is Π 0 1 ), f outputs 1. If we find that P is false, f outputs 0 forever. It is clear that lim t→∞ f (t) exists (as it changes values at most twice) and is either 0 or 1. Consider the statement "lim f = 0". It is ∆ 0 2 , since f is known to have a limit, but it cannot be provably equivalent to a Π 0 1 statement (if it were, it diagonalizes).
Other natural questions concern jump inversion. We proved a number of jump inversion theorems, including the analog of the Friedberg jump inversion theorem for this structure. We ask what analog of Shoenfield jump inversion holds, and whether jump inversion can be combined with upper cone avoidance. Question 10.6. Is there a characterization of the degrees that are cappable?
Question 10.7. Which of the following classes and operations are definable in the lattice of p-degrees?
(1) Π 0 1 , (2) ∆ 0 2 , (3) the jump: d → d * , (4) the hop: d → d • .
Question 10.8. Is there a high/low hierarchy for hop?
Finally, everything we proved was independent of the theory T , only assuming that T is effectively axiomatizable, sound and extends PA − plus Σ 0 1 -induction. Question 10.9. To what extent, if any, does the structure of the provability degrees depend on the underlying theory T ? Are these structures isomorphic for different theories?
